

5/8/12  
c-II\Humiliation

C-II as an instance of reciprocal response to and avoidance of humiliation

(See humiliation as dangerous to a leader—of a nation, and an alliance-- and a politician

An attempted *Fait Accompli* involves (risking and probably achieving) the humiliation of another leader –and thus, his/her fury, rage, desire for revenge, readiness to do illegal, dangerous, murderous things in retaliation (possibly against a scapegoat: or to you, especially if he finds out in time to avert the humiliation)

The original humiliation may reflect a difference in power; thus, it is difficult and risky to respond: perhaps feasible only if a *fait accompli* can be pulled off (requiring secrecy, deception, potential humiliation of the opponent)

Bay of Pigs (H for JFK);

Vienna (likewise: feels put down, from position of SU parity or claimed superiority);

(discovery in Sept. that this is a bluff, a hoax);

tough JFK position on Berlin, forcing K to back off (H for K);

Gilpatric speech (H for K);

Berlin Wall (K avoids H on brain drain;

JFK accepts, with some H);

Turkish missiles are deployed (H for K);

JFK and McN assert possibility of FS vs. SU (H for K, based on superiority);

Both Turk missiles and buildup of MM and Polaris are after Gilpatric speech which reveals that US knows these are not necessary: simply enhancing superiority (H for K)

JFK is preparing a H for K by invading Cuba, **K fears H**;

K plans to equalize and assert equality, by F.A (thereby avoiding or wiping out H over Berlin, Cuba, parity, Turkey);

K successfully deceives JFK on intentions, but raises Republican suspicions and even charges, and also tempts JFK to make a public “commitment,” preparing maximum H for JFK, losses in Congress and election;

JFK discovery of secret and deception—in “defiance” of his warning/commitment, and showing deliberate deception inf”private” channel-- causes rage and fear of H, need to show personal strength, revenge, (lack of constraint by law or fear or concern for hostages (!) (He decides he cannot simply “contain” SU in Cuba by accepting missiles, they must go—see BHO on Iran!—even if a trade is required: but that must be accompanied by a demonstration of manliness, aggressiveness (blockade, threat of invasion, full readiness (though paradox: all this would magnify his H if he has to concede, which he was ready to do!)

(What were the “exercises” for, if not for readiness to invade? Why the public threats?

Honor; face; prestige; relative status/power;

“He can’t do this to me.” (see hst on Korea; Saddam in Kuwait;  
What will China say? Albania?  
Turks, if missiles are removed;  
I’d be impeached;  
(LBJ: an unmanly man

Lessons:

Ask, “will this humiliate” an opponent, rival, ally?

Avoid that (unless it’s the intent)

If so, expect reaction of rage, revenge, readiness to break patterns of behavior and law (Lesson: this is what a humiliated person will do: not only violently and riskily, but in pattern-breaking ways)

[No one in JFK Administration seemed to consider that their plans for Cuba—which only some of them knew of—would (a) be anticipated by K, and (b) would be a feared humiliation for him, a sense of real loss (and impotence: which they took for granted, in “our sphere.”

Nor did K seem to consider just how humiliating his tactics—including private deception—would be to JFK, especially after his overt deployments had led to Republican challenges and to JFK commitment. (“He’ll just have to accept it”: assuming secrecy until operational.

Hyp: (JFK admin. didn’t realize that) the importance of Cuba for the Soviets was not so much that it was in our sphere, a humiliation for us (and threat to US leadership/hegemony in LA), a “provocation,” but that it was a country that had freely

chosen Communism. (Actually? It had been driven to this by US threats and hostility and sanctions, need for ally and support, oil. But at any rate, it was without SU troops! Their dream!)

They felt as strongly about it as we did about Berlin, for other reasons (analyze). But both were islands, far from US, surrounded by hostile forces (US Navy, SU divisions), overwhelming conventional strength. How to protect? The Turkish missiles—representing the NATO FU and FS policy (which, after all, “protected” Berlin and West Germany more than Turkey: the missiles were there for NATO, based on geography and limited range of IRBMs, not because of any threat to Turkey or Italy or Britain! (or US: they were FS weapons, NOT NEEDED FOR DEFENSE OF US! For empire and our hegemony! “Defense” of “allies.”))

So—defend (deter attack against) Cuba the SAME WAY we defended Berlin! And West Germany. (Though we did it—for historical reasons! And fear of an independent Germany, by our allies—without putting missiles in Germany (though we did have nucs in Germany under dual control.) “An attack on Cuba is the same as an attack on the SU—and involves a risk of FS against the US if conventional strength is used to attack independence of and our access to Cuba!”

Which would mean: we would have to live with a recognition of parity, and with a Cuba as ally of SU (including bases: submarines...) (that really would bring about parity!)

Brilliant move: IF it could be done without provoking a blockade or attack. Which required secrecy until operational (perhaps with “cooperation” of JFK: unrealistic, or improbable, though not impossible).

(Compare Israel: “We will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.” Didn’t this depend on cooperation from the US, denial of ambiguous intelligence? Which was forthcoming. (But Israel was a full ally, with strong political support in US!)



Tuesday, May 8, 12  
Cuba II\Notes on DE Files

See file on Humiliation, 5-8-12. And CMC/Politics: Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis

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(Compare Israel: "We will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East." Didn't this depend on cooperation from the US, denial of ambiguous intelligence? Which was forthcoming. (But Israel was a full ally, with strong political support in US!))

JFK presented the missile as a threat to American security: leading people to believe that it was reasonable to fear that the SU intended a first-strike, and was secretly preparing it; that the simple presence of the missiles in Cuba raised a significant probability that we would be attacked..

Yet this claim, and JFK's proposed response to it (which did seem to raise the probability of a nuclear war, in the short run: and did so!) looked "crazy" to many in the US and the world (on the "left"). Just as K's policy either looked aggressive, or "crazy" (in its provocativeness, even if it didn't actually threaten us; its likelihood of evoking a "crazy" response!

Repub charges of JFK weakness on Cuba (prior to Oct. 22, potentially greater after that) were in ignorance of his covert ops against Cuba and preparations for invasion; Just as JFK's charges of weakness against Eisenhower and Nixon just two years earlier were in ignorance (or denial) of their covert preparations for invading Cuba! In neither case could the incumbent respond by revealing their covert actions! (without aborting them, or revealing their criminality). Yet Cuba (and SU) knew in both cases, what the public did not! It was not a secret to them! JFK did have a domestic political crisis (inflicted on him by K). But he chose to define it as a national security crisis (in part, because he anticipated one in Berlin: was that a realistic expectation? WE DON'T KNOW, do we?)

And this was a likely reaction to the SU move, if it were discovered before the missiles were operational (which would dampen or avoid a "crisis": the impression that the US could do something to reverse it)

JFK's blockade was **an unprecedented act of war against a nuclear power; as an attack on the missiles would have been.**

(Thus, "no war" between nuclear states in 67 years ignores that **"acts of war" did occur** (and see Nixon's blockade of Haiphong, including Soviet and Chinese ships, in 1972; and attacks on SAMs in North Vietnam (any Soviets killed?))

After all, the Soviets did **not** block air traffic to Berlin in 1948, which would have been the single precedent. But the possibility of that evoked the first instance of a US FU threat (aside, perhaps, from Iran: privately).

Note also that JFK did this without consulting Congress or warning it in advance (more than an hour, informing it! Despite the absence of an attack **or an imminent attack**: implying that there was an imminent attack possible—false—or that there would otherwise be an imminent and irreversible loss in our security (a smidgen of truth—but not comparable to the loss imposed by JFK's actions!).

Note how little discussion there was (?) about the (lack of) constitutionality of this action, or of the total lack of consultation with Congress (not involving one member in the ExComm deliberations, or informing more than an hour earlier: not one?! (in contrast to LBJ-Russell in 1964-65).

Hyp: JFK expected—correctly—that Congress would press him to do **more** than he wanted to do (after Oct. 16); just as LBJ feared that the public would support the JCS in 1965 if he revealed their recommendations rather than lying about them. (Here secrecy and lying is serving dovish purposes! Yet in both cases, the need for this reflects earlier and larger secrecy and lying, ignorance in the public of the realities...)

Calling it a “quarantine” concealed this constitutional issue (as well as international law: which Acheson derided, as a refuge for wimps). (This was one more case where actually observing the law would have been safer, from the point of view of international security).

Note my hypothesis in 1990: That JFK couldn't do in 1962 what LBJ did do with Congressional leaders in August 3, 1964: explain to them that the apparently reckless and unprovoked Communist moves had probably been **provoked** by covert actions against them: and therefore, inaction could be appropriate. Because in this case, what would have been explained as having been provoked was too big, too aggressive, impugning the covert actions that had led to it. (Imagine if the DRV had actually sunk the Maddox on August 2!) McCone had actually predicted the deployment of the missiles, on this analysis! (What was his attitude toward Mongoose, then? Or, invasion planning, exercises? What had he wanted JFK to do? No one seems to ask that, or answer it!)

Thus, with much of the ExComm ignorant of the covert actions and the planning—and the rest not allowed to tell them—there is, notably, **no discussion** in the first week of ExComm debate of the JFK offer on which the crisis was actually settled (and which was never regarded as worth focusing on or promising until it, surprisingly, succeeded: a no-invasion pledge! And that could have been accompanied by the conditions that Castro actually demanded eventually (and never got): no covert actions, sabotage, assassination, etc.: and even an end to sanctions.

Now, JFK and some others did know of all these; why didn't they, at least among themselves, discuss them as offers that might resolve the crisis? Were they afraid that K would reveal that they had given them up (much worse, in Republican eyes, than that they had been doing these illegal things! ) Just as they feared that K would reveal giving up the Turkish missiles (yet they did do that).



This could have been put to Gromyko as a secret deal (secret from much of the ExComm, too! Like the Cordier ploy, or even the secret Turk trade), on October 18. BUT that could have encouraged K to go public with both sides: his deployment as a legitimate and appropriate response to JFK's illegal acts of war against Cuba: challenging JFK to stop doing what he shouldn't be doing, and not to interfere with the SU doing what it had a right and Cuba had a need for it to be doing, legally.

Moreover, JFK and RFK really didn't want to give up these operations, or to reassure Castro (did they foresee reneging on the no-invasion pledge from the start? See McN's conditions to the JCS, Oct. 2). Whereas they didn't really mind giving up the Turkish missiles (especially secretly!); they didn't want them anyway! And they did want to continue the other activities—still less, do so publicly, and face attacks from the Miami Cubans and Republicans—and they did so.

They brought the world to the edge of TN war—or of US capitulation on Turkey (and possible impeachment or loss of election)—rather than give up hopes of removing Castro, or still worse, have it publicly revealed that they had done so (and had been acting illegally, contrary to their public declarations, since the Bay of Pigs).

Thus, JFK/RFK (and JCS, CIA, other) intentions toward Cuba after October, 1962, were crucial in determining what they did **not** consider doing in order to remove the missiles or to resolve the crisis without war.

Stevenson's proposal of considering giving up Guantanamo (which McN also considered; again, this in itself would have been a small loss, and wouldn't have guaranteed Castro's future from us) was regarded as "beyond the pale," Munich, appeasement, even worse than a deal on Turkey and Italy, which was imagined to be the only relevant trading chip.

Would K have accepted this deal? Well, it wouldn't have met his interest in reducing US missile superiority in the short run (how important was that, **unless** he had short-run plans for Berlin? But even those he could give up, as he did). But it would have met his main concern (even if Castro wasn't happy with a mere assurance; there could have been concrete steps, say in Miami) (with domestic risks for JFK: of assassination?!)

(Which would the JCS have hated worse: giving up the Turkish missiles—they were going to do that anyway, in months!—or giving up plans to invade Cuba? It was the latter that must have looked like defeat, appeasement, surrender, failure, treason, to them! To the extent they believed it, and JFK implemented it. (Weren't plans kept up in 1963?)

Ask: Why did JFK include in the ExComm members who did not know of Mongoose or invasion plans and who he did not intend to enlighten?

Not in order to benefit from informed exploration of how to understand the motives of the Soviet move or how they might, therefore, respond to various US moves, and what those moves might include. That was unreliable, infeasible, while keeping various secrets from the ExComm as a whole, precluding useful discussion.



(My guess: it was purely a consensus-building device for either an illegal and dangerous response (JFK's first reaction) or—guided by RFK and McNamara—for an illegal and dangerous but less dangerous and probably ineffective response, (and eventually for a trade, if K didn't, surprisingly, back down? McNamara pointed to this by Thursday, Oct. 18. What else, in JFK's mind? He may not have expected so much opposition from his civilian members, including RFK, O'Donnell (did he know of Mongoose?) and Bundy (who did know!); hence he was floating the idea to Dobrynin by Oct. 25 or 26, if not earlier).

McNamara—maintaining through all the conferences, as late as 1992 (or in his book *In Retrospect*, on the Missile Crisis)—the secrecy of Mongoose (!? Though it was revealed in 1975-76: without the invasion premise) and the invasion planning (revealed by Hershberg in 1987 and 1990, denied by McNamara and Bundy, though not by Anderson)<sup>1</sup>

So McNamara in 1990 in Havana has to explain K's move as based on a plausible, "understandable" **delusion** of possible US invasion: rather than on a realistic knowledge of US preparations and very plausible guess on intentions.

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<sup>1</sup> Note: It occurs to me—5-8-12—that Anderson and the JCS must have expected that JFK **did** plan to invade in October as an "October surprise," for election purposes! Even if he hadn't decided on that in March, when Mongoose premised it, they probably figured he had come to that as the SU buildup proceeded, as he committed himself, and with McNamara's directive. (And I wonder if they, knowing of Mongoose and Northwoods (!) didn't assume the presence of missiles from almost the beginning, like McCone. (Did they agree with the SNIE in September? What were the JCS saying earlier?) But they wouldn't have wanted to derail that by revealing it, or alleging cynical motives behind it, any more than Goldwater and LeMay wanted to reveal planning for bombing Vietnam in the summer of 1964: they wanted it to happen, even if it **did** help LBJ's chances and hurt Goldwater's to keep it secret. (Selfless of General Goldwater! He could have revealed LBJ's duplicity—no one has ever mentioned this or given him credit for it, even me—and although it would not have won the election—did Goldwater realize this?—it would have prevented a landslide. To put it another way: That **landslide** reflected Goldwater's and the JCS' discretion, refusal to tell the truth behind LBJ's lies, to be whistleblowers, even at the cost of foregoing huge numbers of votes in the election. They did—kept silent about lies and plans for aggression—what they thought was best for the country (and the Air Force), not what was best for their candidate, their party, Goldwater himself. Not only the doves but the hawks were silent: a collaboration (I did what was best for my party and candidate: which I did think was best for the country—at the cost of permitting a war I didn't believe in, though the silent hawks did). There was no counterpart to this in going into Iraq in 2002. That too was an off-year election year, like 1962, and the president was lying, and many in his own Republican party opposed what they knew he was doing, and so did the opposition, but they didn't reveal it: why? 9-11? ...I don't have a grip on this, needs more analysis...



[A new guess for me (5-8-12): See an analogy between JFK's need to take an act of war—the blockade (and threats and preparations for attack: **themselves in violation of the UN Charter!** (a point I don't recall ever having seen made, despite the lack of any precedent (?!)) before making—I conjecture—a proposal for a deal, that would otherwise appear weak, a surrender, an unworthy and perhaps unnecessary concession;

And Nixon's need to bomb Hanoi in December 1972, before making major concessions in the Paris Peace Accords;

Or even, the desire to use the atom bomb on Japan before (rather than instead) offering to weaken demands for unconditional surrender and allow the emperor to remain.]

What I have come to today is the formulation: JFK's "problem" on October 16, 1962 and thereafter was: How to (a) remove the missiles from Cuba (b) without a war, (c) **but with a "crisis"** involving real risk of war, pressed by JFK (therefore demonstrating risk-taking, aggressiveness, "outrage," manliness, militarism, in response to an insult, a potentially humiliating show of disrespect (of an obligation to tell the US the truth, or to respect its sphere of influence, the "Monroe doctrine," or to credit his warnings and commitment and readiness to back it up with violence), (d) preferably but not necessarily without a public trade of missiles in Turkey that might , Italy, or concessions on Berlin, which might split NATO apart ,yet (e) without losing a Democratic majority in Congress in November or (f) without either being impeached or losing reelection in 1964, and (f) without acknowledging US covert actions against Cuba, plans or preparations for invasion, assassination efforts, regime change, but (g) **without giving up any of the latter, covertly.**

The blockade satisfied (c), though it did risk war. **It was an act of war:** not involving immediate violence but threatening violence (that would be illegitimate outside "a state of war": both the threat and carrying it out), credibly since it involved such an investment of instruments and readiness for war that it would be a **great** loss of prestige, "honor," to back down from it and allow it to be peacefully challenged. Any appearance of legitimacy depended on inference that it was a real threat of surprise attack (which the JFK administration didn't believe at all, though they allowed the public to believe that. Like letting the public suppose that Saddam was behind 9-11, or that he already had nuclear weapons or was about to, and that he would use them: supposedly, like Iran.)

The blockade did panic the whole world. It did seem to be highly dangerous; it was hard to imagine Khrushchev backing down from his initial explicit commitment to challenge it (which Dobrynin presumed would be carried out).

(What did the JCS really expect? Were they "sure" Khrushchev would turn back? Did they want that, or hope for a clash? (With the SU, not just Cuba!) (Fulbright thought it more dangerous than attacking the missiles in Cuba: wrong, although the Soviet troops

there were not yet acknowledged). Even the JCS may have thought it more likely to escalate than an attack; did any want that, other than LeMay? Did Shoup?!

JFK gave the trigger to “war” to Khrushchev, a real commitment, no chance to turn back without humiliation: though he was able to temporize, and did so, after Khrushchev basically “blinked.” Allegedly this happened on Tuesday, before the Wednesday deadline, but JFK seemed to be really nervous on Wednesday, along with the rest of the ExComm. They really were risking war with the SU—the world was not wrong about that! The Navy **was** ready to shoot, if defied. And K was provocative with his subs (against advice of Mikoyan and others); and these could have led immediately to nuclear war (unlike ships!), feeling in danger of being sunk or extremely humiliated. (as they were!)

There must have been enormous relief after that climax. Yet the danger was kept up in everyone’s minds by the preparations for invasion. (I hypothesize that JFK after that didn’t foresee great danger; he “knew” he wasn’t going to invade, or attack, though he had to be apprehensive that he would have to accept a great humiliation of a public trade—tempered by the appeal of the UN, which in turn would reflect the continued supposed “danger” to the world (occasioned by the credibility of his own threats and preparations) and would be accepted with relief.

(How would NATO, other than the Turks, actually have responded to a public trade responding to an appeal from the UN General Secretary? General relief, I expect, though it would have confirmed France’s decision to go for its own nucs)

JFK’s lack of fear of war (I conjecture) on Saturday night, and presumably before that (RFK’s offer was Thursday and/or Friday) (and RFK was offering through Holeman on Tuesday, even before the blockade! Though that apparently didn’t get to Moscow) was based on an **overestimation of Khrushchev’s control of “his” side**, and therefore, on JFK’s control of events.

(Castro’s firing of AA; the SAM shootdown; Castro’s recommendation of FS; Savitsky in the sub; the U-2 over the Arctic and Mig interception, with USAF nuclear interceptors;

In short: JFK needed—for re-election in 1964, for his legislative program, and for continued leadership in NATO and the avoidance of future crises with the Soviets--the missiles out, a successful “crisis,” no war (depending on K), **and a continued option of regime change in Cuba** (that latter—unlike missiles in Turkey—was “non-negotiable”).

Without the latter requirement—which reflected both domestic politics and, perhaps, JFK and RFK’s personal desire for revenge, for vindication of humiliation (and recompense to the Bay of Pigs Cubans, whose “betrayal” was indeed a basis for shame and humiliation for the Kennedys)—JFK could have at least attempted to avert the crisis and danger by a private deal whenever he became aware of the Soviet program: as soon as he came to agree with McCone! And with considerable promise of success. This point explains the



total absence of consideration of this offer as a resolution of the crisis, by JFK and those witting early on, or by the unwitting, who would not have guessed it could be effective.

Does PDS underestimate or misread the Kennedys' determination to overthrow Castro, after the Bay of Pigs (the "perfect failure") (leading to depression in JFK, according to...who?) even after the Missile Crisis? That wouldn't necessarily have satisfied the JCS (or their own determination for regime change) given the test ban, the AU speech, Vietnam policy, and his having thrown away the best excuse for invasion they would ever get, along with total preparedness for it. (Seven Days in May, indeed: and look again at when it was that JFK described the conditions for that to Paul Fay).

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As of late Monday or Tuesday (RFK to Holeman to Bolshakov) I believe his strategy to achieve all this was a blockade (as a *fait accompli* to K and to Congress and Castro), with a readiness to trade the Turkish missiles, preferably privately, but if necessary "in response to the UN." (Didn't anyone think of that before Saturday?)

He could hope that the private trade might do it, (with a no-invasion pledge? (with fingers crossed? When was that first mentioned, in DC or to the Soviets?) Even a public trade he apparently thought he could get away with, after the scare over the blockade; most people would be so relieved to get it over with. He must have been surprised by the concern of Bundy and others (his brother?) over the public trade (which probably would never have come up—from K—if he and RFK hadn't suggested it, or promised it, already to Dobrynin! It wasn't something K really cared about, though a public trade would have been good for the stature of the SU.) and their concern about Turkey's resistance to it. (How much

By Saturday evening, Oct. 27, (DC: Sunday morning Moscow) did K even require a no-invasion pledge? (let alone trade with Turkey: he didn't). He didn't really end up with one. Wasn't that apparent from the moment that Castro refused inspection: was that Sunday evening? That was long before the missiles were actually removed. K may have hoped for some while that Castro would give in on this, to Mikoyan. But he didn't. And the missiles came out anyway: though it was clear by then that Castro would not accept inspection; and that the no-invasion pledge was conditioned on inspection.

So K definitely did not get a binding non-invasion pledge. Yet he took the missiles out anyway. Doesn't that mean that he would have promised to take them out Sunday morning—in face of the possibility of a Cuban shootdown of an American recon plane—even if he had known there would be no no-invasion pledge? He did get, and could say to the Politburo and to Castro, that he had gotten a promise; but it actually wasn't worth much, and Castro knew it.

Would K have held out, on Sunday, even if JFK had refused a no-invasion pledge and just said, "That's it: out. One more plane shot at..." (That's what RFK did say! Though he also offered a worthless private offer on Turkey). What if K had known that Castro would not accept inspection: would he have refused the Kennedy "deal"? I say: NO.

(The JCS fury, on the other hand, reflected their rage at JFK even offering a no-invasion pledge, which they expected to be binding, at that time.) (JFK didn't tell them: "We can rescind that, as soon as the missiles are out." (I'm trying to recall a similar, very cynical promise/bluff around the same time.)

QUESTION: Can it be that the Soviet generals (and privates) were not comparably furious at Khrushchev (as the Cubans were)? The "goose chase." And backdown. (Of course, they probably weren't as eager to defend Cuba—to start with—as the JCS were to invade it. And they knew how suicidal it would be for war to occur!

Why did K get away with as little criticism from his System as he got? It doesn't seem to have been a key factor in the "quiet coup" against him two years later.



4/18/12 11:54 AM

ADM 12\C2\notes on files.docx

--See exchange with Blight, Sept./Oct 1987, on Ellsberg revelation: Cuban takeover of SAM site. (Harvard vetoes my appearance; I, enraged, arrange op-ed, Tufts seminar?...

    Their skepticism: no one else knows about this. SI! (did exist; and Hersh confirms interpretation)

    I was wrong! BUT: crucial inference: K did not order shootdown, and was appalled by it. (See Sergei K's comment, on loss of control: in Cooke).

    Also: (none of us knew at the time, 1987: when did it come out?) SI did refer to a serious incident: tac nucs were in Cuba, they were being moved to threaten Guantanamo (!) and an accident with them, with casualties, did occur, shown on SI.

    Again, K's now-confirmed fear of loss of control referred as well to these!

So it was FEAR by K—not JFK's private concession, or his willingness to make public concession (just revealed on Aug. 27, before Blight's proposal to me, and revealed at Hawk's Bay in March 87 by Rusk)—that led to K's "agreement" to remove missiles. (Hyp: given shootdown of U-2, K would have removed missiles even without JFK's "promise" (rescinded) not to invade Cuba, let alone without private concession on Turkey.

Yet: though both K and JFK were fearful of loss of control, and didn't want war, they postponed concessions sufficient to avoid war while actually risking loss of control, which might well have occurred. Their concern didn't guarantee no war, which "almost" occurred (if, say, Castro's gunners had downed a plane on Saturday, or Sunday morning before K's speech).

--File: Deterrence (Type II) (but even Type I: LOW) based on threat of loss of control : unauthorized action, (or, threat of delegation, to commanders who don't act "rationally" with respect to national strategic interests, or wrt long-term concerns (environment, "collateral damage" to allies and neutrals, recovery, species): who act on rules, impulse, "emotion," revenge, "Let the heavens fall" (let the species become extinct: better extinct than red: Goebel's wife)

    C-2, NATO, P-II, "existential deterrence" (unpack this); Taiwan Straits (delegation, attitude of PACAF, etc.)

--HISTORIOGRAPHY OF C-II

    What people didn't know, at various times;  
    Why they didn't know it;  
    How this affected their interpretations

e.g. SU warheads, tac nucs, delegation, Castro decision to fire, no K order to fire SAM; AND incident at Los Banes (?) SAM site, accident, SI on casualties (what if they had known this, as I did, in 87, and didn't know it was misinterpreted by NSA?); RFK double ultimatum; nucs on SU subs; safety problems...Cordier ploy; (earlier, private offer on Turkey); MONGOOSE; NORTHWOODS; ASSASS. ATTEMPTS; PSALM



Selective willingness to take evidence seriously (that makes X look bad, or good: JFK, K, ...; or makes prob of war look high, or low...

[TCS and Neustadt et al say, "But you're the only one who knows of this!" That WAS true of the SI on accident; but it could have been ANY of the above! Rusk had just revealed something of which HE was the only one who knew.]

When did anyone besides me conjecture that K had not ordered the SAM shootdown (which I inferred from SI plus other allegations)? (I told Paul Jacobs in 1976; did others believe it at Harvard in 1987, aside from my assertions?)

When did these people learn about Mongoose? It doesn't come out (for me or public) until Branch and Crile in 1975-76 and Church Committee 1975-76.

Is it in the March 1987 discussions or the August 87 at Harvard or the 1992 Moscow? It was NOT in RFK's memoir, 13 Days, 1969 (edited by Sorensen: did he know at the time? Did Schlesinger? Not in their histories). Is it in Allison's study? (RAND 1970?)

This turns the crisis on its head! In terms of US provocation (see also Northwoods, and invasion plans). And in terms of the ability of the whole (not wholly cleared) ExComm to judge SU motives, or possible reactions (e.g., to assurance of no invasion!); hence, reliance of cleared members—esp. the president—on their advice, what their actual role was!

(JFK had to run the crisis on his own understanding, which he couldn't share with his "advisors"—see my talk with HAK about special clearances ( PSALM, Mongoose, invasion plans, assass. Plans...) not only without real advice from ExComm (as a whole) but while fooling them (too, along with public) about what he knows and what he plans to do, indicating to them (especially JCS) that he has an entirely different plan in mind, different bottom line...)

(which increases the risks: he has to **postpone** his willingness to trade—and to try an ultimatum (as well as a private trade)—(without knowing—K's secret!—that K isn't in control of the action JFK is trying to deter with a threat: AA fire; or even, SAMs! Or nucs, which JFK doesn't even know need to be deterred!) while risks are being run.

Same for K: he can't concede too fast, in face of generals who are concerned about the opinion of Albania! On Saturday morning, **he** makes a "last effort" to get a good outcome, by accepting JFK's private proposal through RFK Friday night of a trade.(Given RFK, K has good reason to expect that JFK will accept this "reasonable offer" as JFK wants to do Saturday morning: but he's argued out of it by McG and others. But Castro could have shot down US planes on Saturday afternoon! (Almost

did). (JFK could still have held off attack one more day, until he had tried his public/private offer and ultimatums.)



DE NOTES May 1, 2012

We didn't want a Soviet base on Cuba, any more than the Soviets wanted US bases on their borders, as in Turkey.

The Soviets had a right to put IRBMs (or ICBMs) or MRBMs in Cuba, with the consent or request of the Cubans. (Castro spoke both ways on who had first suggested the placing of IRBMs. Later evidence all points to Khrushchev having proposed this, to some quite brief discussion and concern of the Cubans, who fairly quickly agreed to do this "for the Soviets.")

The Cubans believed this should be done openly, for maximum quick deterrence. US invasion plans seemed imminent to them since the spring of 1962 (and were, in terms of US Mongoose planning and exercises). Adzubei: JFK had likened Cuba to Hungary (each standing aside while the other exercised intervention to dominate "its own sphere." (No one has denied (?) that JFK said this.)

To deter attack, it was necessary and sufficient to have lots of Soviet troops, protected by tac nucs (despite the danger of putting these into Cuba: as we did in Germany and other NATO countries, to the anger and fear of Khrushchev). MRBMs were not necessary to deter; but they did tie the Soviets sharply into responding to an attack on Cuba, which would be an attack on their missiles; and they did confront the US itself with great damage as a strong possibility in any attack on Cuba;

For the Soviets, the missiles added significantly to launch a no-warning attack and to attack US SAC bases—though the SU would still be subject to total destruction. Thus, there would be an incentive—even if only "nominal"—to reap the advantage of striking first instead of second: to preempt an American attack.

If they were allowed to remain, they could be increased in number very greatly, making our land-based forces and C3 very vulnerable to first strike. (It would not be only the US that could credibly threaten to escalate against an opponent's FU in Europe. Though even so, the lack of a strong conventional option—which McNamara did hope to encourage—would make US FU likely if faced with a SU invasion. In that case, it would also make a US FS simultaneously plausible: as Ike had arranged and envisioned. And the presence of MRBMs in Cuba—vulnerable FS forces (as AJW had pointed out, and Stone recognized)—

AJW had not only pointed out the need for, and the lack of "sufficient" (implausibly, except to Trots and Cold Warriors: see Waltz) second-strike forces; he had also pointed out the "first strike only" and thus "provocative to preemption" nature of the IRBMs in Turkey (and he did this before they had actually been deployed: which was done "under" the RAND AJW-disciples in the Pentagon: Hitch, Rowen, Enthoven,

Kaufmann, Trinkly, McGarvey, and me: did any of us (or AJW) explicitly oppose this?! Or warn McNamara? Would it have done any good? Given Turk opposition: who desired IRBMs there, despite some misgivings, for the same reasons that the Cubans came to want the IRBMs and not want them removed: they did add to deterrence of SU non-nuclear attacks on Turkey (**like the Cuban MRBMs, they could, by the way, be destroyed by non-nuclear attacks by accurate, short-range aircraft!**); and they tied the US to the defense of Turkey; and they were a contribution to NATO, reciprocating (and ensuring) acceptance into European affairs. The very risks they involved (subjecting them to threats and complaints from the superpower opponent, and possible attack in event of war)—leading to some controversy and misgivings—were also a potential gift to the alliance, creating reciprocal bonds (like contributing troops to an intervention).

Controversies in SU: Whether the deployment should (and could) be secret. It turned out to be more feasible than our CIA could have anticipated.

(Note: Was McCone aware of the Bolshakov assurances, or channel? If he had been, would he have been so confident that missiles were being deployed?)

Camouflage, on the other hand, was not even attempted: A remaining mystery of the events. (My inference: that K felt it was not necessary, given timing of deployment just before election, seems not confirmed; rather K was assured that missiles would not be seen. Russians are contemptuous of this judgment. Castro says at one point, he could have helped camouflage.

Another **mystery**: K didn't seem to have a plan B for missiles being discovered after they had arrived in Cuba (very good deception until then) but before they had become operational. Nor did he worry, so far as he knew, nor was he warned, about the effects on JFK's response of his prior a) secrecy) and (b) deception (Bolshakov in particular); or of the effects of the two clear commitments JFK had undertaken (in his confidence in the deceptive statements); nor of the effects on US politics of his prior open deployments, including SAMS (which, by the way, could be and were mistaken for MRBMs, in reporting from Cuba!), effects which led to JFK commitments (which were after missiles had started arriving, and others were on the way!)

There was not, so far as we know, any advice to or consideration of reversing the elaborate process after the warnings were given: rather, only the speeding up of the process: which could have worked (though not unlike stepping on the gas to get to a gas station, when the gauge is reading empty) (or, like speeding up deployment to VN—or rather, continuing them while renewing RT on a larger scale-- in fall 1965, when it became clear that the DRV was matching the deployments)

(General question: What does an empire do when its initial hopes or premises are disappointed: as in WWI? When an "error" has appeared so great as to condemn the whole effort to failure, as being a mistake from the start? Exposing the leadership to attack by domestic rivals? Stone on Cuba:



Still, the speedup could have worked if overhead recon had been blocked by the SAMS and AA: as was legally justified (hadn't China just attacked a U-2? (SAC's, or one of Chiang's, which we had given just after the U-2 shootdown in 1960: see Stone). This is what McCone expected: it was why he thought he had time to go on a honeymoon. Why wasn't the Oct. 14 flight brought down? (Hyp: would that have fueled demand for an invasion, by Republicans? Been a big issue in the election? Yet, the legitimacy of further overflights was based on what the U-2 was allowed to find!

The Sovs on Cuba believed they had been detected, on October 14. Did they tell this to Soviets in Moscow? **(UNKNOWN)**. If they had, or did do so, how would this have affected Moscow decisions? They could, at that point (before US announced it) have announced it themselves and proclaimed their right to deploy, warning against any interference. (A bluff: as K did do after Oct. 22, but while still on the weak position of concealing the movement and denying it, rather than affirming its legitimacy **at the UN**. **Mistake by K:** not to tell Dobrynin and Zorin immediately (or earlier) and affirming right to do it, and warlike nature of blockade, not justified by SU furtive behavior.

**Question:** Did K take the US silence after October 14 as assurance either that they hadn't seen it, or that JFK was acting as (I suspect) K hoped, concealing it from US public before election? (DE to Mikoyan to Beschloss) But JFK couldn't keep this from leaking very long: as Ike had with U-2 (favored by JCS); moreover, in lack of camouflage, it wasn't ambiguous (like cratology): lots inside would "know" what it was; JFK could keep it secret as long as he did only because he was keeping up JCS hopes he would attack (which, I conjecture, he intended NOT to do after, perhaps, the first hour or two); even so, it **did** leak to Keating, even before Oct. 14! Thus, Repubs were affirming it while JFK was denying it (in effect, even after Oct. 15, until Oct. 22), creating maximum political vulnerability for Dems.

Why blockade at all? The arguments that this was irrelevant (unless, which was possible, no warheads had yet arrived) were strong! But they did constitute a "bold" reaction, an act of war, an illegal act, stronger than doing but complain (and trade), but less risky than an attack (though Fulbright thought—wrongly—it was more risky; he underrated Soviet involvement if we had attacked! )

(Did ExComm really come to agree on blockade? Did hawks really believe this was better? Who changed their minds? And what did it? They **were** induced to come aboard. (Did Taylor really agree to this? The JCS certainly didn't!) (Nitze? Dillon? McCone?)

It was like April Hawaii conference in 1965 which gave Amb. Taylor a chance to come aboard the request for more troops. Did Clifford ever come to agree with July escalation? No. Did WPB? Ball? Privately, McGeorge Bundy? Nor Humphrey, Hughes. Even McN didn't agree with the lack of mobilization, the deception about

50,000, the deception about funding. Nor Gen. Harold Johnson. (Any of the Chiefs? No)\_.

What Khrushchev was doing was essentially making Cuba part of the Warsaw Pact in the same way, and with the same deployments, as we extended to members of NATO:

**The Cuban deployment was K's one and only serious use of a FU threat:** to protect a valued ally (valued more than we realized: for "sentimental" reasons) who could not be defended by conventional forces. Tac nucs and forces would have done it. But K had multiple objectives, not only Cuba.

K's talk of his missile capability in other cases were bluffs:  
Against England in Suez, 1956; defending Cuba (from SU, or possibly Cuba!?) in 1961; defending China in Taiwan Straits crises, 1958? Berlin, 1959 (our rockets will fly automatically); superiority in Vienna conference, 1961. (What about Brezhnev in Yom Kippur war, 1972?